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The World Bank and water policies

The World Bank and water policies


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By Yul Francisco Dorado Mazorra

The progress of water privatization policies in Latin America supported by market decisions, which exclude definitions related to the general welfare and the human rights approach, is undeniable.For the purposes of this document, we will confine ourselves to presenting arguments on how today the protagonism of the World Bank (WB) guides the design of national policies for drinking water and basic sanitation, promoting corporate control of water.


"We believe that the provision of clean water and sanitation services is a real business opportunity." Lars Thunell CIF / GBM (2) The progress of water privatization policies in Latin America supported by market decisions is undeniable, which exclude any definition related to general welfare and a human rights approach.

In the market, the major players are multilateral agencies and corporations, with the due and necessary instrumentalization of national governments, ready for the rest to meet the demands or demands that the former impose on them. All this framework provokes any number of questions formulated from technical and political knowledge, but more importantly, from the common sense of any citizen or user (as they are called for market purposes), affected by the quality and rates of the service.

For the purposes of this document, we will confine ourselves to presenting arguments on how today the role of the World Bank (WB) guides the design of national drinking water and basic sanitation policies, fostering corporate control of water. In the end, we will consider alternatives to public-private partnerships (PPPs), as possible scenarios for the intervention of the social movement in its purpose of stimulating changes in the global policies of the World Bank.

Market or society

Whatever the term, most of the institutional public messages seem to imply that the possible development model only has a place if we choose one of these terms, the market, which presents us as opposed to society; or that they have ended up promoting that the market is the exact equivalent of democracy.

But this idea that has arisen mainly around the neoliberal path ends up reducing the meaning of quality of life to mathematical results.

In this way, the political speeches encouraged by a generation of technicians, academics and civil servants, who have managed to permeate the street language, have been linked. For this reason, today the market or corporate citizenship is spoken of as if it were new inevitable paradigms, a thought typical of all ideologies and inspired and inspiring models of a single revealed truth. Also, the new millennium brings with it actors and scenarios, forming new categories of analysis: The binomial democracy / citizen is contrasted with that of market / user. The State cedes its monopoly of what is public to the market and with it its obligation to provide resources for the welfare of the peoples, rethinking the concept of popular sovereignty and privatizing social solidarity. Citizenship that is traditionally preached by individuals, is extended to companies through corporate citizenship. Civil society, promoter of common interests and aspirations, restricts its actions to market relations, where people organize themselves according to their competitiveness and ability to access goods and services. The legal order is externalized by the transnationality of the companies, the contractual provisions of the International Financial Institutions - IFIs and free trade agreements. The national sovereignty of the Nation-States trembles before the dictatorial mandates of the multilateral organizations (3), vigilant of the fulfillment of the Washington Consensus (today in crisis), meaning in
the practice is a “global state of exception”. The values ​​of equity, solidarity and freedom are contextualized in the neoliberal logic of macroeconomic stability, economic growth and efficiency. The global and the local are not due to a “cultural dispute”, but to their positioning in the market. And so we could continue in this exercise of analytical contrasts, but beyond particularities, the background is the encounter and disagreement with the neoliberal model.

In these terms, it is of concern that the market is the model that the governments of Latin America chose (or accepted) to “meet” their obligations to provide potable water and basic sanitation services to the communities, when the imperative of their mandate is and It must be the general welfare, the universalization of the right to water to achieve decent living conditions and development. But how do we continue to approach this model of commodification of water? We will deal with this below.

The World Bank

Although the accent that we propose to express is located in the elements of public policy that guide the recent interventions of the World Bank, let us remember that the privatization process began in the 1990s when the structural reforms imposed on the countries of Latin America, led to the arrival of of international operators that took ownership or concession of water services, on the basis of guaranteeing administrative and financial efficiency. The years and bad experiences demonstrated the opposite, and already at the beginning of this millennium we observed the withdrawal of several transnational companies that could not overcome the social and economic conflicts that originated their bad management practices, characterized by high rates, little coverage and appropriation of resources public, as is the case of Cochabamba and the water war. In addition, in some countries changes were made in the orientation of sectoral policy and the example of Uruguay is the most emblematic, by constitutionalizing the public domain of water and the direct and exclusive provision of drinking water and sanitation services by state legal entities.

Before continuing, what is the World Bank Group (GMG)? How does the World Bank play within the Group? World Bank refers only to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA).

The ‘World Bank Group’ comprises IBRD, IDA, and three other institutions: the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (4). And here is something important that also constitutes a complete contradiction in the face of the harsh reality that we receive from the WBG: its mission is “poverty reduction”.

But the crises do not stop the privatizing neoliberal model, it reinvents itself and its most recent strategy to co-opt national governments is the Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), which commit not only the WBG but all the IFIs, such as the Inter-American Development Bank - IDB.

The impact of PPP associations is usually verified via the reaction caused by the announcement or implementation of privatization policies, which is to say in practice, when an entire institutional scaffolding has already been put into operation to make them operational. This is what happens in Colombia with the Departmental Water Plans (PDA) already in implementation, but entangled in their own inconsistencies in administrative and financial design, and by the rejection of local organized communities that denounce the delivery of their water and sanitation systems to private operators and the appropriation of water resources. Similar processes are found in Mexico, Peru and other countries in the region.

The WB, which finally ends up imposing on national governments the design of PPPs associations via the granting of loans, defines a model that responds to the following characteristics:

1. Public Water Policies

In our traditional conception of the law and of the social contract that precedes and guides the Nation-States, public policies respond to sovereign decisions that are specified from a constitutional framework that guides legislative developments, in this case for the drinking water and sanitation sector. This has been the case, but what we are seeing is something very different. The water policies are defined from a contractual framework imposed from the strategic documents of the World Bank that give life to the credit agreements and operating contracts. From then on, it is the countries that must adapt their national regulations, in a kind of pyramid where the base is constituted by the mandates of the World Bank and the upper part by law, and in the middle the regulatory standards (5).

For the year 2003, and this is a year that we take as a reference to guide the analysis, it was clear for the World Bank that the water and sanitation sector continued to represent a great business opportunity at a global level and compared to energy, telephony and transportation, it was the one that credited less “investments or interest” of the private ones (6). To move forward, it was necessary to modify the current strategy that placed the long-term ownership or concession of the services directly in the large water transnationals, because this strategy, as we have seen, was subject to great social and political questioning and rejection. The solution found by the WB was the Public-Private PPPs and what followed was the implementation of the model as a policy of privatization management, which began to be sold to national governments. How?

Let's see some examples:

1.1 Although in Colombia the PPPs associations began their institutionalization in 2007 when Law 1151 of 2007 -National Development Plan 2006-2010- received the PDA Departmental Water Plans for business management of water and sanitation (7), the work The end of the preparation has been found since 2005 when the World Bank authorized a fixed margin loan for US $ 100 million - repayable in 13 and a half years, including eight and a half years of grace - to support the water and sanitation sector, defining the following Objectives: “to support investments related to the improvement of services; expand private sector participation in medium-sized cities, through the introduction of results-based management agreements with specialized operators; make adequate investments in water supply and
sanitation in disadvantaged rural areas of Colombia; and improve the viability and financial responsibility of the participating municipalities and at the same time strengthen their execution capacity (8) ”. This intervention by the World Bank accommodates its legitimacy in the mandate of article 365 of the 1991 Political Constitution, which authorized the provision of public services by individuals.

Approved the National Development Plan 2006-2010, come the subsequent developments of document COMPES 3463 of 2007 (9), Law 1176 of 2007 (10) and Decree 3200 of 2008 (11), which generate an entire regulatory framework favorable to PPPs associations. Along the way, for political and legal reasons, the Water Law project collapsed (12). This initiative collided with the resistance of the social movement as it was considered an instrument that deepened the privatization process of aqueducts via concessions, granting greater guarantees to private ones, as read in the explanatory memorandum of the project: “… the purpose is to provide greater security legal to the concessionaire allowing the recovery of the investment ”.

This normative body instituted the budgets for the PDA, in its mission to legitimize the arrival of the policies and credits already negotiated with the World Bank. The exploration of the WB documents that establish the strategy of the PPPs associations serve to verify in the PDAs elements such as the figure of the specialized operator ("operates efficiently and effectively"), the financial exchange for the management of resources, the management of subsidies to - supposedly - increase coverage, the principle of cost recovery through tariffs, the pledging of resources from the general system of shares and royalties; measures in the field of control of operations and even mechanisms for citizen participation.

1.2 Similar practices take place in Peru. Preceded by credits negotiated with the World Bank that deserved from the head of the National Water Authority (ANA) comments such as "we feel extremely satisfied with this project as it will contribute to modernizing the management of our water resources by integrating the public, private and society sectors. to achieve sustainability in the availability of the resource "(13), Law 29338 of 2009 known as the Water Resources Law (14) is issued, which in its article II indicates that" this Law is intended to regulate the use and integrated management of water, the actions of the State and individuals in such management, as well as the assets associated with it ”. In other words, the public-private partnership is imposing itself from the Bank's credit strategies that seek to consolidate an environment of legal security for those who are going to be the hydraulic infrastructure operators15 or for those who, from the Agua Para Todos - PRONASAR program, have already been acting as specialized service operators in pilot projects for small cities. And this is another characteristic imposed by the World Bank, by including small cities as targets for privatization when large capitals were before, but we will analyze this later. The IDB is also doing its part by approving loans for US $ 10 million for water resources management reform (16).

1.3 In Mexico, the incorporation of the private initiative to the water service of Mexico City is announced and at the same time we are familiar with the draft decree for the enactment of the Potable Water and Sanitation Law, stumbling upon the privatizing language of legislation and documents in project or under implementation in Colombia and Peru, for example, establishing national public policies under the imperative of granting the right to provide drinking water and sanitation services in whole or in part to a public, private or mixed operating body. But there is more, the draft decree incorporates references from the mandates of the World Bank such as the National Financial System for Drinking Water and Sanitation, concessions, a rate system that should reflect the real cost of services, including the operating agency's sustainability margin. In short, we leave one country but in the next we find the exact replica of the aspirations of this multilateral agency.


What about Mexico is not an unfortunate inspiration for the current government. One of its antecedents can be found in the loan dated August 4, 2005 (17) when the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors approved a loan of US $ 25 million for the technical assistance project for the modernization of the water and sanitation sector, which aims to develop the tools and instruments necessary to stimulate local authorities to improve both the financial sustainability of the water and sanitation sector, as well as the efficiency of their services. The facts that we know today indicate that the Bank's "stimulus" was specified in the draft decree for the enactment of the Potable Water and Sanitation Law, to make effective the programs to improve the efficiency of public services, giving them reasonable levels of management, operational efficiency and financial viability, as proclaimed and required by the aforementioned credit. Conclusion, the Bank's credit resources are like the initial quota to mobilize the action of the governments in the concretion of the PPPS associations and with it the arrival of the private or mixed operator.

2. Specialized Operators

In the management model of PPPs associations, specialized operators - OE (private entrepreneurs for practical purposes), are the recipients or beneficiaries of this new privatization model, so that each of the measures incorporated into public policy has the imperative to generate conditions to make them viable in operational and financial terms. In them the public-private alliance is materialized in order, according to the World Bank, to professionalize the service and attack inefficiency, contribute to local development and leverage financial resources and knowledge. Now, the calls to fulfill the role of OE are initially the local companies that, according to Alain Locussol (18), make privatization much more acceptable, and then give way to transnational companies. In this decision we can also interpret a nationalist strategy that facilitates the action of the World Bank and the transnationals.

The Bank goes further in structuring this remarkable mechanism and imposes a management model on the executing agencies: New Public Management (19), which, although it is designed on elements of greater efficiency that some water and sanitation systems require incorporate, they do not stop having a perverse expression because they are exclusively functional to the forces of the market and the profitability of the business.

3. Rates

By considering water as an economic good, the Bank orders the full recovery of costs with a profit margin. The WB documents question third world service providers for their operational inability, expressed in the difficulty of knowing costs, weak regulation processes, low rates and thus little or no profitability, as well as their limitations in cash flow, which according to the World Bank, prevents them from finally addressing the investment needs demanded by water and sanitation services.

Here we return to the regulatory part, as an element of capital importance for the success of PPPs associations. For the Bank, the PPPs contract and the regulations go hand in hand: "An excellent design of the concession contract or PPP but a poor regulatory performance will create a poor performance of the sector." “Excellent regulatory performance but poor PPP or concession contract design will create poor sector performance. Regulation cannot correct the problems of poor design. " "Key Lesson: Both are needed, good contract design and regulatory framework and supervisory effectiveness, for a good performance of the sector and to achieve the benefits of private participation" (20).

In response to this state of affairs, the Bank proposes the regulation of the financial sustainability of the model, which implies that the rates must cover all the costs of administration, investment, operation and maintenance, taking care to warn that where an accelerated increase is not possible Because it can lead to protests and social reactions, it is the subsidies that must attend to the increase in coverage. But experience also tells us that to the subsidies we must add the resources from the loans of the IFIs and the returns from the financial market fed with the channeling of all the resources that, in the case of Colombia, would be the transfers of the general system of participation and mining royalties (coal and hydrocarbons). In other words, the model is based on economic efficiency and
financial sufficiency, for which it is imperative to rate at average cost, leaving behind the marginal rate (21), as a historical problem of the microeconomics of regulation that prevents the possibility of mobilizing private operators, according to the World Bank.

In a market scenario, the rate exemplifies its importance as a milestone of PPP associations, to the point that for the Bank “there are usually other complementary objectives (in addition to the rate) such as increasing coverage, improving service quality and achieving obligations universal service… (22) ”In this neoliberal panorama, what is truly important, the Bank sees as“ complementary ”, with which the disagreement of the social movement with the positions of the World Bank is explainable and necessary!

Let us conclude this section by knowing the position of Aguas de Barcelona by proposing as a strategy to attract investment a "clear regulatory framework and legal security, supervision and management in different hands, and political decision and public-private alliance".

Regarding rates, it proposes "payment of the real rate and direct subsidy to poor sectors", which implies, in order, a real rate that pays investment, operation and maintenance costs; and direct subsidy from the State through Municipalities and that the beneficiary pays a minimum account, with loss of benefits if he does not pay (23). The coincidence between the multilateral and the transnational organization is not surprising, since the ultimate goal of water policies is to strengthen corporate control of water. They are positions that feed back.

4. Decentralization and Small Cities

In the eighties and nineties we found a significant number of Latin American States constitutionalizing and implementing territorial decentralization, as part of the structuralist reforms influenced by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; at the same time that the neoliberal concept of a minimal State was installed and with it the privatization of public services such as education, health and water and sanitation systems.

For the stage of PPPs associations, the decentralization element begins to play again, by configuring an opportunity to establish these associations, in an exercise that also crosses the variables of regulation and private participation. When we say opportunity, it is not because of the strengths of the decentralizing model, but rather because of the concerns that the World Bank maps in the form of weaknesses, by establishing that it generates “dangers of atomization, loss of economies of scale and commercial viability, transfer of political interference from the national sphere. to the local and difficulty of applying centralized regulation ”(24). For example, for the first years of this millennium, Colombia is ranked as an advanced country in terms of decentralization and regulation, with a private sector participation of less than 25%. Mexico advanced in terms of decentralization, but with a medium level of regulation and with a participation of less than 25% of the private sector. Peru, similar to Colombia in decentralization and regulation, but in terms of private sector participation, is classified as an “incipient” state.

Projected this exercise within the context of what today are PDAs for Colombia, we can locate structuring elements that are redefining the decentralizing model from the water and sanitation sector, by generating and imposing conditions for the regionalization of services, meaning the "suspension" of competences to the municipalities that see the management of their participation resources and royalties intervened, giving up control of the public companies and with it the loss of the municipal automatic. But this has a more hierarchical background, as it enables the concentration of public water and sanitation companies in PDAs to make the market attractive by concentrating capital, enabling economies of scale and business structures. Hope that in the medium term, after local investors, the water transnationals will come buying the shares, thus sealing the great objective of the World Bank's privatization strategy in favor of the corporations.

But this strategy of reversing the decentralization process has its necessary complement in a variation to the privatization strategy that the Bank strictly promoted in the 1990s and is to target small cities, when before they were the big capitals. Here, of course, the market expands in terms of resources, infrastructure and users, so that today all water services are of interest to PDAs, read BM.

5. Participation

The World Bank tries to learn from its own mistakes and for this reason, for PPPs associations it imposes participation and social control as a “format” to legitimize the public policy of the Plans and to avoid possible acts of corruption. In other words, place greater emphasis on social communication and citizen participation (Vivian Foster / BM), for which a significant number of civil society NGOs have co-opted for “community work” that, with special care, are in charge of making visible in documents and media. “The lessons learned during the recent past are extremely helpful in facilitating a successful application of the new policy. Such experiences have shown that policies tend to be more efficient when the country owns the new programs, when policies reflect the country's priorities, and when the views of citizens have been duly considered in the design of such policies. (…) In the project document, Bank staff must include a description of the efforts made with respect to participation and consultation with civil society, as well as the results of the participatory processes with which the national strategy for development (25) ”(26).

The strategy of participation and social control today has a great position in the Bank's policies, serving to legitimize all kinds of credit and operational interventions, which local governments extend through diagnoses, hearings and publicity of the acts as a mechanism of transparency , supported by the "democratization attempt" by community organizations and partisan political structures.

Alternatives to PPPs partnerships

The policies imposed by the World Bank must have their necessary correlation in proposals that neutralize or direct management practices of the water and sanitation systems, in accordance with the concept of what a true water policy should be, understood as the exercise of what public for the general welfare and universalization of the fundamental right to water.

The social movement has been promoting local and cross-border initiatives such as public-public and public-community alliances, which go through strengthening the public management model that may still characterize some water companies, in the understanding that many of those that still retain a legal structure of "public companies", such as Bogotá and Medellín, in their management model they follow the WB's rulings, incorporating instruments for total cost recovery via tariff, profit generation and supply cuts due to no payment, thus denying the right to water and the free vital minimum. Without going into further analysis, at this point we can conclude that within a market model such as the one that today characterizes the water and sanitation sector in the vast majority of our countries, including Colombia, of course, the "public" cannot be derived from the legal structure that supports the creation of the company, but from the objectives and business model that it executes. If you share the predicaments of the World Bank in tariff management and supply cuts due to non-payment, for example, we are facing a neoliberal business efficiency model and it cannot be classified as “public”.

Given that the model of PPPs associations must be attacked from the head and this is undoubtedly the World Bank, we want to conclude this document by presenting two (2) windows of opportunity for the management of the social movement, which we propose to deepen and instrumentalize as an argument and strategy for political action.

The first is related to the conduct assumed by the World Bank through the IBRD, in the face of the political reality that Uruguay defined in the referendum (2004) that incorporates the public domain of water and the direct and exclusive provision of drinking water service and sanitation by state legal entities. The WB's response was not to terminate credit support on the basis, for example, of having no alternative other than PPP associations. No, the decision was to adjust its protocol of agreements to the new legal reality of the country, recognizing from the contents of the approved credits that the constitutional amendment of 2004 prohibits any form of provision of water and sanitation services by private parties, without this means changing the general objectives of the APL Program in force since 2002, although, says the Bank, the absence of private sector participation could increase the risk of achieving some of the objectives, so in order to mitigate these risks, the project APL-227 specifies as an objective new ways to promote competition and support the separation of the functions of the sector (28).

With this, we are meaning that the WB renounced any conditionality that could link private operators or strict regulations for financial business management or rate conditions for cost recovery, among other things, thus accepting the sovereign decision of Uruguay, as it will have to accept. Any other proposed by a country in the exercise of its sovereignty. What remains for the other countries of the region as a political message from the World Bank? Que al interior de su compleja estructura de intereses, hay cabida para modelos diferentes al de mercantilizar el agua, que posibilitan proteger modelos Públicos como el de Uruguay, respetando el derecho fundamental al agua. ¿Qué necesitamos para avanzar? Por supuesto la voluntad y el compromiso con el Estado Social de Derecho por parte de los gobiernos de turno, que excluya de los acuerdos y créditos condicionamientos empresariales de mercado, y/o sacar adelante propuestas como el referendo del agua en Colombia, como expresión de lo ya conseguido por Ecuador y Uruguay en sus Constituciones Políticas.

Pero al BM hay que confrontarlo en todos los escenarios. En paralelo a las denuncias contra la política de asociaciones PPPs que las organizaciones sociales trabajan en foros, campañas y movilizaciones, debemos adelantar acciones de presión al interior del Banco Mundial. La presión interna no se debe confundir con el "trabajo desde adentro" o promover aproximaciones o diálogos voluntarios. En vez de ello se enfoca en mapear el poder del Banco, identificar a los tomadores de decisiones claves, trasladando nuestros análisis económicos, políticos y sociales, recordando en todas las formas que la misión institucional del BM es la lucha contra la pobreza. Una de las banderas de esta estrategia debería ser exigir al Banco Mundial que adopte una directiva operativa que remueva las condiciones de privatización en sus políticas y proyectos de préstamos, y que apoye los sistemas públicos de agua que sean responsables, eficientes y que operen en el interés público.

A manera de epílogo

Son abundantes los argumentos para constatar que el BM, en representación de intereses corporativos, impone a través de los empréstitos diversas formas de políticas privatizadoras, encubiertas bajo supuestos programas autónomos de los países, para el caso de Colombia, los Planes Departamentales de Agua, movilizando una estrategia que modifica las legislaciones de modo que se ajusten a las exigencias y oportunidades de los operadores privados, independientemente de la modalidad adoptada.

No obstante lo anterior, muchas de las grandes ciudades de los países del G8 (29) con mayor peso dentro del BM, mantienen el control público de sus servicios de agua y saneamiento o han empezado a revertir las privatizaciones (30) (Ej. casos París (31), Grenoble (32) y poblaciones de EE.UU. (33)), aunque no les molesta que se impongan al resto; y de otro lado, países como Uruguay, en defensa de su soberanía, votan por el manejo público del agua, ante lo cual el propio BM debe plegarse, y lo hace.

Lo anterior demuestra para el movimiento social, dos cosas claves: la primera de ella es que el modelo privatizador no es inevitable y mucho menos el único camino posible; en segundo lugar que si los países anteponen la soberanía sobre sus recursos naturales a la cual tiene derecho, los organismos multilaterales se ven no solo obligados a respetarles, sino que adaptan sus políticas a tales demandas. Es decir que un movimiento social fuerte que ponga sus identidades por encima de sus diferencias en materia de defensa del ejercicio de sus derechos, para el caso, al agua, puede demostrar la falibilidad de lo que ha dado en llamarse “el mercado” como si se tratase de un designio divino y no un invento humano, por lo tanto susceptible como lo es de ser manipulado por los grandes intereses económicos y no como debería ser para combatir la pobreza, mandato máximo del BM.

Yul Francisco Dorado Mazorra. Coordinador para América Latina de Corporate Accountability International http://www.stopcorporateabuse.org.

Octubre de 2009 – texto incluido en el Libro Digital 2 Millones de Firmas por el Agua, publicación coordinada por ECOFONDO.

Notes:

(1) Coordinador para América Latina de Corporate Accountability International http://www.stopcorporateabuse.org
e-mail: [email protected] /octubre de 2009

(2) Semana del agua en Estocolmo Agosto 2008

(3) Fondo Monetario Internacional FMI, Grupo Banco Mundial GBM y Organización Mundial del Comercio OMC.

(4) Tomado de http://www.bancomundial.org/ (24-10-09)

(5) Ver: http://bit.ly/rMTf0

(6) Ver: http://bit.ly/3MZgv1

(7) Ley 1151 de 2007, Art.6: Descripción de los principales programas de inversión. “La estrategia en agua potable y saneamiento impulsará el manejo empresarial y los esquemas regionales a través de la implementación de los Planes Departamentales para el manejo empresarial de los servicios, articulando las diferentes fuentes de recursos, con un mejor control sobre la ejecución de los mismos, y sin perjuicio de las competencias de las Corporaciones Autónomas Regionales, como máxima autoridad ambiental en el área de su jurisdicción. Dentro de este marco, se desarrollarán la gestión y los instrumentos regulatorios y de control necesarios para adelantar procesos de transformación empresarial, con la vinculación de operadores especializados, en lo posible bajo esquemas regionales, o con la conformación de organizaciones eficientes de tipo comunitario autorizadas por la Ley 142 de 1994”.- Ver también Art. 91: Planes Departamentales para el Manejo Empresarial de los Servicios de Agua y Saneamiento. Ver: http://bit.ly/150T2Y

(8) Ver: http://bit.ly/3Hhejz

(9) Ver: http://bit.ly/1exrzW

(10) Ver: http://bit.ly/2Folqe

(11) Ver: http://bit.ly/4mg2OR

(12) Proyecto de Ley N° 365 – CÁMARA de 2005, “por la cual se establecen medidas para orientar la planificación y administración del recurso hídrico en el territorio nacional”

(13) Ver http://bit.ly/3xjbs2

(14) A la fecha, 26/10/09, no ha sido reglamentada.

(15) En el proyecto de reglamento de la Ley 29338 se define a los Operadores de Infraestructura Hidráulica como “las entidades, públicas o privadas, que prestan alguno o todos los servicios públicos siguientes: regulación, derivación o trasvase, conducción, distribución o abastecimiento de agua. Son responsables de la conservación, operación, mantenimiento y mejoramiento de la infraestructura hidráulica a su cargo, con arreglo al Reglamento de Operadores de Infraestructura Hidráulica que aprueba la Autoridad Nacional del Agua”.

(16) Ver http://bit.ly/2GLIuS/krBAD6U=

(17) No. de identificación del proyecto: P091695 worldbank

(18) Alain Locussol, especialista principal en abastecimiento de agua y saneamiento en la Oficina Regional de África del Banco Mundial.

(19) Ver: http://www.clad.org.ve/full…

(20) J. LuisGuasch. Consejero Regional Senior en Regulación y Competitividad Departamento de Infraestructura, Finanzas y Sector Privado América Latina y Caribe, Banco Mundial / Temas críticos en la regulación del sector de agua potable y saneamiento: la microeconomía de la regulación
http://bit.ly/hKAUx

(21) J. LuisGuasch / BM http://bit.ly/hKAUx

(22) J. LuisGuasch.

(23) Ver: http://bit.ly/cd33T

(24) Gustavo Saltiel / BM http://bit.ly/2vOpyV

(25) Banco Mundial: http://bit.ly/ZTfS3

(26) “.. organizaciones de la sociedad civil con las cuales el Banco mantiene relaciones permanentes a través de diálogo de políticas, capacitación y/o colaboración operativa”. Ver: http://bit.ly/2L9ho1 (consulta 30-10-09)

(27) OSE Modernization & Systems Rehabilitation Project– APL 2: “48. The 2004 Constitutional mendment. The original APL Program design hoped private concessions would provide incentives to enhance OSE’s competitiveness. Indeed, by 2004, 16 successful concessions or permissions to private operators had been made. However, the 2004 Constitutional amendment now prohibits any form of privately provided services in the water and sanitation sector. Although the Constitutional Amendment does not change the overall objectives of the APL Program as stated above, the absence of private sector participation could potentially increase the risk of achieving some program objectives by: (i) reducing incentives for OSE to become more competitive, and (ii)le ading to political economy unbalances stemming from OSE’s monopolistic sector position. In order to mitigate such risks, the APL-2 project will specifically seek to encourage new means of encouraging competition and support the unbundling of sector functions, as described below”. May 31/2007

(29) Alemania, Canadá, Estados Unidos, Francia, Italia, Japón, Reino Unido y Rusia.

(30) Ver: http://www.remunicipalisation.org/

(31) Ver: http://bit.ly/30zD2O

(32) Ver: http://bit.ly/44k7YR

(33) Ver: http://bit.ly/2SgfUG


Video: What Does The World Bank Actually Do? (July 2022).


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  6. Tesida

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  7. Botan

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